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Abstract	
Digital	media	are	often	blamed	for	accelerating	the	decline	of	political	parties	as	channels	for	
citizen	participation.	By	contrast,	we	show	that	political	engagement	on	social	media	may	
revitalize	party	activities	because	these	platforms	are	a	means	for	both	party	members	and	
ordinary	citizens	to	discuss	politics	and	engage	with	and	around	political	parties.	Using	online	
surveys	conducted	in	Germany,	Italy,	and	the	United	Kingdom,	we	find	that	party	members	
engage	in	a	wider	variety	of	party-related	activities	than	average	respondents,	but	the	same	can	
also	be	said	of	non-party	members	who	informally	discuss	politics	on	social	media.	Moreover,	the	
strength	of	the	relationship	between	party	membership	and	engagement	decreases	as	the	
intensity	of	political	discussion	on	social	media	increases.	This	suggests	that	political	discussions	
on	social	media	can	narrow	the	divide	in	party-related	engagement	between	members	and	non-
members	and	to	some	extent	flatten	rather	than	reinforce	existing	political	hierarchies.	Finally,	
we	find	the	correlation	between	party	membership	and	engagement	is	stronger	in	Germany,	
where	party	organizations	are	more	robust,	than	in	Italy	and	the	UK,	highlighting	the	role	of	
party	organizational	legacies	in	the	digital	age.	
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Social	media	have	become	central	hubs	in	contemporary	flows	of	political	communication	across	Western	democracies.	By	contrast,	political	parties,	one	of	the	key	institutions	of	representative	democracy,	are	facing	legitimacy	and	organizational	crises.	Eight-two	percent	of	European	Union	citizens	do	not	trust	parties,	while	only	14%	profess	some	confidence	in	them.1	Party	membership	has	plummeted,	inspiring	somber	assessments	that	“the	party	is	over”	(Whiteley	2011).	Digital	media	have	been	touted	as	both	the	problem	and	the	solution	here.	On	the	one	hand,	theorists	of	the	so-called	mobilization	hypothesis	contended	that,	under	certain	circumstances,	the	internet	may	favor	political	disintermediation:	it	would	enable	citizens	to	engage	with	specific	issues,	campaigns,	and	politicians	on	their	own	terms	rather	than	via	hierarchical	organizations	(Edwards	2006),	and	this	would	bring	new	people	into	contact	with	parties.	Others,	however,	have	suggested	that,	rather	than	encouraging	new	voices,	the	internet	simply	provides	an	additional	participatory	venue	for	those	already	active	in	traditional	organizations,	thus	stifling	rather	than	rejuvenating	political	activism	(Norris	2003).	The	core	empirical	contention	of	this	latter	approach,	which	in	the	early	days	of	internet	politics	research	became	known	as	the	normalization	hypothesis	(Margolis	and	Resnick	2000),	is	that	no	substantial	change	has	occurred	both	in	the	balance	of	power	within	and	across	political	organizations	and	in	the	typical	profile	of	those	who	participate.		 The	debate	between	supporters	of	mobilization	(often	referred	to	as	“revolution”)	and	normalization	has	been	widely	criticized	for	its	straw-men	arguments	and	poorly	defined	concepts.	Scott	Wright	in	particular	has	argued	that	researchers	should	abandon	either/or	approaches	and	be	sensitive	to	the	possibility	of	hybrid	“normalized	revolutions,”	where	“new	technologies	create	deeply	significant,	perhaps	wholesale	changes	to	the	function	of	
established	political	institutions	without	overthrowing	those	institutions.”	(Wright	2012:	253)	This	is	particularly	relevant	when	it	comes	to	political	parties.	In	spite	of	the	need	for	a	more	
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nuanced	approach,	the	idea	that	the	internet	simply	reinforces	political	inequalities	has	become	almost	entrenched	in	the	literature	(Schlozman,	Verba,	and	Brady	2010).		The	evidence	we	present	here	suggests	that	reinforcement	is	not	the	only	relevant	outcome	of	citizens’	political	interactions	on	digital	media.	Instead,	we	show	that	informal	political	discussion	deepens	party-related	engagement	by	offering	new	avenues	by	which	party	members	can	provide	parties	with	support,	feedback,	and	resources,	and	it	broadens	party-related	engagement,	by	encouraging	those	who	are	not	party	members	to	get	involved.	We	use	online	surveys	of	representative	samples	of	internet	users	in	Germany,	Italy,	and	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2014	European	Parliament	elections.	These	data	show	that	while	digital	media	cannot	per	se	enhance	political	action	among	disengaged	citizens	they	can	provide	avenues	by	which	those	who	informally	discuss	politics	on	social	media	can	find	opportunities	and	incentives	to	engage	with	activities	related	and	relevant	to	political	parties.	Political	discussions	on	social	media	contribute	to	closing	the	gap	in	party-related	engagement	between	members	and	non-members,	to	some	degree	flattening	rather	than	reinforcing	existing	hierarchies.	Thus,	digital	media	are	reconfiguring	party-related	engagement.	This	is	a	“hybrid”	development	of	party	activism	in	Chadwick’s	(2007)	terms	because	it	combines	some	features	of	the	older	concept	of	permanent	membership	with	some	newer	features	of	what	Rachel	Gibson	(2015)	has	termed	“citizen-initiated	campaigning”.			
Party-Related	Engagement	Among	and	Beyond	Party	Members	For	the	last	three	decades,	political	parties	have	faced	sharp	declines	in	their	organizational	strength	and	legitimacy,	in	spite	of	maintaining	their	institutional	centrality	in	representative	democracies	(Mair	1995).	Linkages	between	parties	and	voters	have	eroded,	resulting	in	electoral	dealignment	(Dalton	1984),	a	hemorrhage	of	party	members	(Van	Biezen	et	al.	2012),	and	declining	voter	turnout	(Blais	2007).	Some	parties	have	met	these	challenges	with	
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three	strategies:	first,	offering	members	process	incentives	such	as	primaries	to	select	candidates	and	internal	referenda	on	key	policy	decisions	(Norris	2006);	secondly,	lowering	the	membership	threshold,	for	instance	by	allowing	online	enrolment	and	offering	the	possibility	to	register	as	sympathizers	rather	than	full-duty	members	(Scarrow	2015);	thirdly,	reviving	voter	mobilization	efforts,	especially	in	historically	low-turnout	countries	such	as	the	United	States	(Nielsen	2012)	and	the	United	Kingdom	(Whiteley	and	Seyd	2003).		As	a	result	of	these	developments,	volunteers	and	sympathizers	increasingly	contribute	to	party	activities	without	being	permanently	committed	to	them	(Scarrow	2015),	which	in	turn	redefines	what	it	means	to	be	politically	involved	with	and	around	a	party.	Such	integration	between	different	types	of	party	activists	has	been	noted	not	only	in	Europe,	where	most	parties	still	carry	the	legacy	of	their	mass-membership	past,	but	also	in	the	United	States,	where	party	organizations	are	more	fluid	and	campaign-oriented	than	in	Europe.	Recent	studies	conceptualize	American	parties	as	“extended	networks”	or	“long	coalitions”	that	incorporate	and	bring	together	different	types	of	elites,	supporting	organizations,	and	individual	activists	(Bawn	et	al.	2012).	Heaney	and	Rojas	(2015)	argue	that	many	of	the	participants	in	the	post-9/11	anti-war	movement	identified	and	engaged	with	both	the	movement	and	the	Democratic	Party,	and	accordingly	pursued	“inside-outside”	strategies	combining	party-style	electoral	mobilization	with	movement-style	protest	without	necessarily	depending	on	the	party’s	formal	structures.	The	hybridization	of	roles	and	repertoires	of	action	between	party	insiders	and	outsiders	resulted	in	what	Heaney	and	Rojas	(2015)	call	the	“party	in	the	street”.	The	media	are	generally	understood	to	play	important	roles	in	selectively	influencing	different	aspects	of	party	membership	and	engagement.	The	first	generation	of	research	on	the	transformation	and	decline	of	party	organizations	mostly	focused	on	the	mass	media,	and	television	in	particular,	as	potential	drivers	of	change	in	the	structure	of	incentives	in	party	
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recruitment	and	activism	(e.g.	Kirchheimer	1966;	Panebianco	1988).	When	digital	media	spread	across	Western	democracies,	a	consensus	emerged	that	the	internet	mostly	served	as	a	reinforcing	mechanism	for	those	activists	who	were	already	engaged	with	parties	(Norris	2003)	and	that	parties	did	not	embrace	the	web	to	democratize	their	decision-making	and	decentralize	their	campaigning	operations	(Ward	and	Gibson	2009).	As	“Web	2.0”	platforms	diffused	across	Western	democracies,	parties	maintained	a	cautious	approach,	establishing	their	presence	on	social	media	for	fear	of	missing	out	but	only	partially	embracing	their	potential	for	dialogue	and	engagement—resulting	in	what	Jackson	and	Lilleker	(2009)	termed	“Web	1.5”	architectures	of	limited	participation.	However,	a	second	wave	of	theory	and	research	emphasized	that	parties	have	much	to	gain	from	marshaling	digitally	enabled	citizen	engagement.	Political	discussion	and	engagement	on	social	media	is	based	on	spontaneous,	serendipitous,	and	lower-threshold	practices	which	occur	in	informal	interactions	as	part	of	citizens’	everyday	lives	rather	than	in	environments	controlled	by	parties	(Chadwick	2009;	Vaccari	et	al.	2015).	As	a	result,	social	media	may	provide	opportunities	for	voters	to	engage	with	politics	in	less	asymmetrical	power	relationships	than	earlier	internet	websites	and	party	apparatuses.	Embracing	these	changes,	parties	may	develop	a	new	organizational	model,	envisioned	by	Margetts,	of	“cyber	parties,”	which	“use	web-based	technologies	to	strengthen	the	relationship	between	voters	and	party	rather	than	traditional	notions	of	membership.”	(Margetts	2006:	530)	In	this	new	arrangement,	parties	may	marshal	what	Gibson	(2015)	termed	“citizen-initiated	campaigning”	by	individuals	who	do	not	belong	to	the	party	staff	but	carry	on	some	relevant	electioneering	activities	for	it	through	the	web.		In	this	study,	we	assess	how	the	web	2.0	can	contribute	to	what	we	define	as	party-
related	engagement.	By	this	we	mean	forms	of	political	participation	that	allow	parties	to	acquire	resources,	receive	feedback,	and	distribute	messages.	The	studies	reviewed	so	far	
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suggest	that	the	web	may	contribute	to	party-related	engagement	in	essentially	two	ways.	First,	by	allowing	existing	party	members	to	find	new	ways	to	engage	in	such	activities,	digital	media	may	deepen	party-related	engagement	among	party	members,	equipping	“party	campaigners”	with	new	tools	to	support	their	parties.	Secondly,	individuals	who	are	not	party	members	may	find	opportunities	to	engage	with	parties	online	as	a	result	of	the	affordances	of	social	media—in	particular,	the	informality	and	spontaneity	of	political	discussions	that	occur	therein.	In	this	case,	social	media	in	particular	may	broaden	party-related	engagement	beyond	party	members,	allowing	“citizen	campaigners”	to	play	a	greater	role	in	the	activities	and	organizational	lives	of	parties.	As	regards	“party	campaigners,”	research	shows	that	members	still	fulfill	vital	functions	for	parties	(Scarrow	2015)	and	the	web	enables	such	members	to	perform	new	activities	that	are	integrated	with	existing	offline	practices,	thus	resulting	in	hybrid	participatory	repertoires	(Chadwick	2007).	The	possibility	that	those	who	are	already	active	within	parties	deepen	their	involvement	by	adding	new	tools	to	their	campaigning	arsenals	has	often	been	dismissed	as	irrelevant,	at	best	constituting	evidence	of	reinforcement	(Norris	2003).	However,	these	assessments	overlook	the	fact	that	party	activists	can	relay	the	information	they	find	online	to	less	interested	individuals	through	interpersonal	communication	occurring	both	on	the	web	and	face-to-face.	For	instance,	Norris	and	Curtice	(2008)	found	that	people	who	get	election-related	information	on	the	internet	are	more	likely	to	talk	to	others	about	it—a	pattern	that	was	confirmed	by	a	comparative	analysis	of	seven	Western	democracies	(Vaccari	2013).	Thus,	party	members	can	use	digital	media	to	act	as	conduits	between	parties	and	other	citizens	who	are	not	directly	contactable	by	parties	(Gibson	2015).	The	internet	also	allows	party	members	to	provide	input	and	feedback,	which	may	boost	organizational	legitimacy	by	promoting	reflexivity	(Coleman	2005),	and	to	contribute	financial	resources	quickly,	easily,	and	often	in	pursuit	of	specific	goals.		
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As	regards	“citizen	campaigners”,	various	studies	suggest	that	political	discussion	and	self-expression	on	social	media	may	enhance	engagement.	Participation	in	political	discussions	on	social	media	can	expose	individuals	to	relevant	political	information,	which	may	motivate	them	to	take	further	action	(Kwak	et	al.	2005;	Vaccari	et	al.	2015).	Moreover,	the	non-political	nature	of	social	media	may	attract	individuals	who	are	not	inclined	to	engage	with	political	institutions	(Wojcieszak	and	Mutz	2009),	especially	as	they	encounter	“weak	ties”	that	expose	them	to	viewpoints	they	would	not	otherwise	meet	(Gil	de	Zúñiga	and	Valenzuela	2011)	and	accidentally	encounter	political	information	(Valeriani	and	Vaccari	2015).	Thus,	Rojas	and	Puig-i-Abril	(2009)	found	that	the	more	individuals	express	themselves	politically	through	ICTs,	the	more	they	also	attempt	to	mobilize	others	through	social	networking	sites,	which	in	turn	translates	into	greater	offline	engagement.	Gibson	and	Cantijoch	(2013:	714)	found	that	digital	media	may	be	leading	to	an	“upgrading”	of	political	discussion	“into	a	more	active	participatory	form”	that	pushes	citizens	up	in	the	ladder	of	engagement.	Relatedly,	Gil	de	Zúñiga	et	al.	(2014)	show	that	political	expression	on	social	media	mediates	the	effects	of	social	media	use	on	both	online	and	offline	political	participation.	As	political	discussion	on	social	media	is	related	to	political	participation,	there	is	reason	to	believe	that	it	should	also	be	positively	associated	with	party-related	engagement.		Although	many	studies	have	addressed	how	engagement	with	political	parties	and	political	discussion	on	social	media	independently	correlate	with	political	participation,	no	research	so	far	has	addressed	the	interaction	between	these	two	factors.	Looking	at	generic	measures	of	political	information	and	participation,	Xenos	and	Moy	(2007)	found	that	the	effects	of	political	information	acquired	online	on	civic	and	political	participation	are	contingent	on	political	interest,	with	the	highly	interested	experiencing	greater	participatory	gains.	However,	their	study	predates	the	diffusion	of	social	media,	whose	affordances,	we	have	argued,	entail	qualitative	changes	in	the	relationship	between	information,	expression,	
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and	participation.	If	political	discussion	on	social	media	can	act	as	a	pathway	towards	greater	engagement	through	serendipitous	exposure	to	information,	contact	with	weak	ties,	and	enhanced	self-expression,	it	could	also	lead	to	greater	participatory	gains	among	party	non-members	than	members,	thus	narrowing	the	engagement	gap	between	the	two	groups.		
Hypotheses	We	start	from	a	holistic	definition	of	“party-related	political	engagement”	that	is	sensitive	to	the	increasing	integration	of	online	and	offline	forms	of	political	action	(e.g.	Oser	et	al.	2013)	and	hybridization	of	participatory	repertoires	(Chadwick	2007).	Party-related	engagement	may	be	the	purview	of	both	“party	campaigners”	and	“citizen	campaigners”.	In	the	former	case,	party	members	use	online	and	social	media	tools	to	help	their	parties.	We	therefore	hypothesize	that	party	membership	will	be	positively	correlated	with	party-related	engagement	
(H1).		 Political	parties,	however,	are	complex	and	varying	structures	that	organize	and	recruit	members	differently	across	Western	democracies.	To	account	for	some	of	these	variations,	we	assess	the	relationship	between	party	membership	and	party-related	engagement	in	a	comparative	framework,	an	aspect	that	has	been	neglected	in	studies	of	social	media	and	politics	so	far.	We	focus	on	Germany,	Italy,	and	the	United	Kingdom	because	they	are	large	Western	democracies	where	we	can	identify	meaningful	systemic	variance	while	keeping	constant	other	characteristics—such	as	their	political	development,	parliamentary	form	of	government,	and	the	fact	that	they	voted	simultaneously	and	with	the	same	electoral	system	for	the	May	2014	European	Parliament	elections.	Comparing	Germany,	Italy,	and	the	United	Kingdom	allows	us	to	identify	country-level	effects,	to	assess	the	robustness	of	our	findings	across	different	political	systems,	and	to	evaluate	how	the	strength	
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and	inclusiveness	of	party	organizations	affects	the	relationship	between	party	membership	and	engagement.	The	characteristics	of	party	organizations	differ	substantially	across	the	three	countries.	British	party	membership	declined	dramatically	over	the	last	thirty	years,	as	the	main	parties	lost	more	than	a	million	members	(Van	Biezen	et	al.	2012:	11).	This	downfall	is	not	compensated	by	the	recent	surges	in	membership	of	the	Scottish	National	Party	(which	had	93,000	members	in	January	2015),	UK	Independence	Party	(39,000),	and	the	Green	Party	(44,000;	see	House	of	Commons	Library	2015).	As	a	result,	Britain	ranks	third	to	last	among	the	27	European	Union	member	countries	in	terms	of	total	party	membership	as	a	percentage	of	the	electorate,	with	just	above	half	a	million	members	in	total	(Van	Biezen	et	al.	2012:	5).2	Italian	party	membership,	while	historically	higher	than	in	Germany	and	the	UK	(Van	Biezen	et	al.	2012),	collapsed	over	the	last	decade,	as	the	main	center-right	party	(Forza	Italia)	all	but	neglected	enrolling	members	and	the	main	center-left	party	(Partito	Democratico)	saw	its	membership	decline	from	one	million	upon	its	founding	in	2007	to	a	reported	100,000	in	2014.3	The	Five	Star	Movement,	which	polled	a	surprising	second	in	the	2013	general	elections	and	mostly	organized	online	in	its	early	days,	does	not	formally	enroll	members,	but	allows	those	who	register	on	the	leader’s	blog	to	vote	in	primaries	and	internal	referenda	(Mosca	et	al.	2015).	By	contrast,	German	major	parties	still	pursue	the	model	of	the	
Volkspartei,	which	is	"mainly	concerned	with	the	integration	of	[…]	at	least	a	large	share	of	citizens	into	the	political	decision-making	process"	(Jun	2011:	204)	and	thus	demands	that	parties	recruit	substantial	memberships.	Although	enrolment	faltered	over	the	last	two	decades,	as	of	2012	the	six	major	German	parties	still	enrolled	a	total	of	1.28	million	members.4	Moreover,	German	parties	receive	public	funding	on	the	basis	of	the	contributions	they	raise	from	members,	and	thus	have	a	particular	incentive	to	recruit	them.	Finally,	there	are	stark	differences	in	the	legitimacy	of	political	parties	in	the	three	countries:	in	June	2014,	
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30%	of	Germans	claimed	to	trust	parties,	whereas	only	15%	of	British	and	6%	of	Italian	respondents	did.5	We	expect	these	differences	to	play	a	role	in	shaping	the	factors	that	lead	party	members	to	engage	with	party-related	activities	online	due	to	both	supply-	and	demand-related	mechanisms.	On	the	supply	side,	better	organized	parties	should	be	able	to	more	effectively	channel	members’	participation	(Heidar	2006)	and,	conversely,	less	structured	parties	should	be	less	capable	of	mobilizing	their	members.	On	the	demand	side,	where	parties	are	stronger,	individuals	aiming	to	influence	politics	should	consider	parties	as	more	viable	linkages	to	government	and	policymaking	(Lawson	1980)	and	should	thus	be	more	likely	to	both	become	members	and	engage	with	party-related	activities.	By	contrast,	where	party	organizations	are	weaker,	individuals	eager	to	affect	political	outcomes	should	see	limited	value	in	party	membership	and	may	pursue	their	political	goals	by	other	means.	Because	German	parties	are	comparatively	stronger	than	Italian	and	British	ones,	we	hypothesize	that	party	membership	will	be	more	strongly	correlated	with	party-related	
engagement	in	Germany	than	in	Italy	and	the	United	Kingdom	(H2).	As	discussed	above,	informal	political	discussion	on	social	media	may	also	breed	“citizen	campaigners”,	that	is,	individuals	who	are	not	party	members	but	who	engage	with	party-related	activities.	We	thus	hypothesize	that	engagement	with	political	discussions	on	
social	media	will	be	positively	correlated	with	party-related	engagement,	even	after	controlling	
for	party	membership	and	attitudes	towards	parties	(H3).		Finally,	we	explore	the	possibility	that	informal	political	discussion	on	social	media	
moderates	the	relationship	between	party	membership	and	party-related	engagement	(H4).	We	expect	that	political	discussions	on	social	media	reduce	the	distance	between	members	and	non-members	in	party-related	engagement	by	facilitating	informal	political	self-expression,	
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which	is	a	pathway	to	participation.	Thus,	we	expect	the	sign	of	the	interaction	between	discussion	and	membership	to	be	negative.		
Data	and	Variables	Data	have	been	collected	through	three	online	surveys	conducted	in	Germany,	Italy,	and	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	aftermath	of	the	European	Elections	of	22-25	May	2014.	The	surveys	were	in	the	field	between	May	27-June	20.	For	each	country,	a	sample	(N=1,750)	representative	of	internet	users	aged	16-74	was	constructed	on	the	basis	of	online	panels	administered	by	IPSOS	where	respondents	were	offered	non-monetary	incentives	to	participate.	Invitations	were	sent	in	each	country	until	we	achieved	a	sample	that	matched	our	target	population	on	the	following	characteristics:	age,	gender,	region	of	residence,	occupational	condition,	and	educational	level.	Response	rates	based	on	AAPOR’s	(2011)	RR1	standard	were	17%	for	Germany,	21.4%	for	Italy,	and	20.1%	for	the	United	Kingdom.	Because	the	quota	sampling	allowed	us	to	achieve	a	very	close	fit	between	sample	margins	and	population	margins,	no	weighting	was	required	for	the	German	and	Italian	samples,	whereas	the	UK	data	was	weighted	to	ensure	that	sample	margins	matched	population	margins	with	respect	to	occupational	condition.	It	is	worth	noting	that	in	2014	Eurostat	estimated	that	92%	of	Britons,	86%	of	Germans,	but	only	62%	of	Italians	used	the	internet.6	As	a	result,	even	if	our	samples	are	representative	of	the	populations	with	internet	access	in	each	country,	the	Italian	sample	is	likely	to	deviate	from	the	general	voting-age	population	much	more	than	the	British	and	German	ones.	When	assessing	the	validity	of	our	data,	it	should	be	noted	that	nonprobability	samples	such	as	the	one	employed	here	tend	to	produce	estimates	of	relationships	between	variables—which	is	what	our	hypotheses	focus	on—that	are	consistent	with	those	obtained	with	probability	samples	(Pasek	2015).	
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We	measured	our	dependent	variable—party-related	engagement—as	a	combination	of	six	different	citizen	activities	that	can	be	beneficial	to	political	parties,	listed	below.	In	activities	A	and	B,	individuals	act	as	informal	spokespersons	for	parties	and	candidates,	in	activities	C	and	D	they	provide	feedback,	and	in	activities	E	and	F	they	contribute	time	and	money.7	 A. Encouraging	other	people	to	vote	for	a	party	or	candidate	on	social	media	(performed	by	9.9%	of	German	respondents,	15.5%	of	the	Italian	ones,	and	17.2%	of	the	UK	ones).	B. Encouraging	other	people	to	vote	for	a	party	or	candidate	by	sending	an	email	(Germany	6%,	Italy	12.5%,	UK	13.4%).	C. Commenting	on	a	post	of,	or	sending	a	message	to,	a	party	or	candidate	on	social	media	(Germany	8.7%,	Italy	18.5%,	UK	14.3%).	D. Sending	an	email	to	a	party	or	politician	(Germany	10.2%,	Italy	15.9%,	UK	17.9%).	E. Financing	a	political	party,	candidate,	or	campaign	(Germany	5%,	Italy	6.7%,	UK	7.1%).	F. Participating	in	the	activities	of	a	political	party	(Germany	8.6%,	Italy	11.5%,	UK	9.3%).		The	data	show	notable	integration	across	these	different	endeavors:	Cronbach’s	alpha	across	the	six	items	is	.806	in	Germany,	.765	in	Italy,	and	.821	in	the	UK	(.799	when	combining	data	from	all	three	countries).	The	average	values	of	the	index,	which	ranges	from	0	to	6,	are	.48	in	Germany,	.83	in	Italy,	and	.80	in	the	United	Kingdom,	and	the	difference	between	Germany	and	the	other	two	countries	is	statistically	significant	at	p=.000	based	on	independent	samples	t-tests.	Although	this	is	only	a	descriptive	finding,	it	is	interesting	in	itself	because	
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Germany	also	stands	out	as	the	country	where	parties	are	organizationally	stronger	and	more	trusted	by	citizens.	We	return	to	this	point	below.		 We	test	our	hypotheses	through	multivariate	Poisson	regressions,	which	are	appropriate	when	the	dependent	variable	is	a	count	variable.	We	ran	three	separate	regressions	(incrementally	including	the	interaction	terms	we	considered)	to	estimate	the	value	of	the	index	of	party-related	engagement.	Our	key	independent	variables	are	party	membership8	(which	allows	us	to	test	H1),	the	interaction	between	party	membership	and	country	(with	Germany	as	reference	category,	allowing	us	to	test	H2),	political	discussion	on	social	media9	(which	allows	us	to	test	H3),	and	the	interaction	between	party	membership	and	political	discussion	on	social	media	(mean-centred	to	mitigate	risks	of	multicollinearity,	allowing	us	to	test	H4).	Since	some	of	the	questions	employed	to	build	the	dependent	variable,	as	well	as	those	dealing	with	political	discussion	on	social	media,	were	only	asked	to	those	respondents	who	claimed	to	have	a	profile	on	at	least	one	major	social	networking	site	(82.1%	of	German	respondents,	88%	of	Italians,	and	85.9%	of	British	ones),	our	regression	models	only	include—and	should	be	generalized	to—social	media	users.	The	models	control	for	gender,	age,	education,	income,10	trust	in	parties,	interest	in	politics,	political	efficacy,11	the	country	of	the	respondent	(with	Germany	as	reference	category),	and	exposure	to	political	news	on	different	media	channels.	All	non-dichotomous	independent	and	control	variables	have	been	normalized	to	range	between	0	and	1	to	facilitate	comparisons	across	coefficients.	
	
Findings	Table	1	shows	the	results	of	Poisson	regression	models	predicting	the	value	of	the	index	of	party-related	engagement.	The	pseudo-R2	coefficients	at	the	bottom	of	the	table	suggest	that	the	models	fit	the	data	satisfactorily,	and	increasingly	so	as	interactions	are	included.	TABLE	1	ABOUT	HERE	
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As	shown	by	the	positive	and	statistically	significant	correlations	between	party	membership	and	party-related	engagement	across	all	three	models,	party	members	engage	in	substantially	more	activities	than	the	rest	of	the	sample,	thus	confirming	H1.	This	is	true	in	all	three	countries	considered,	but,	as	model	1	shows,	the	relationship	is	significantly	stronger	in	Germany.	Thus,	our	H2	predicting	a	stronger	correlation	between	party	membership	and	party-related	engagement	in	Germany	than	in	Italy	and	the	United	Kingdom	is	also	confirmed.		 Party-related	engagement,	however,	is	not	solely	the	purview	of	party	members,	as	citizen	campaigners	also	substantially	contribute	to	these	activities.	This	is	shown	by	the	fact	that	the	coefficient	for	political	discussion	on	social	media	is	positive	and	statistically	significant,	thus	supporting	H3.	It	should	be	kept	in	mind	that	the	models	control	for	party	membership,	political	efficacy	(which	is	positively	and	significantly	associated	with	party-related	engagement	in	models	1	and	2),	interest	in	politics	(which	is	positively	and	significantly	associated	with	party-related	engagement	in	all	three	models),	and	trust	in	parties.	This	means	that	political	discussion	on	social	media	can	provide	a	pathway	to	party-related	engagement	even	after	relevant	political	attitudes	are	taken	into	account.		 Finally,	model	2	shows	that	political	discussion	on	social	media	moderates	the	relationship	between	party	membership	and	party-related	engagement,	as	predicted	by	H4.	The	coefficient	is	statistically	significant,	and	the	sign	is	negative,	which	indicates	that	the	strength	of	the	relationship	between	membership	and	engagement	decreases	as	the	intensity	with	which	one	discusses	politics	on	social	media	increases.	For	instance,	a	typical12	Italian	respondent	who	is	a	party	member	and	discusses	politics	on	social	media	one	standard	deviation	less	than	average	is	predicted	to	participate	in	slightly	more	than	one	of	the	six	party-related	engagement	activities	we	tested	(1.22	on	a	0-6	scale),	which	grows	to	about	two	activities	(2.04)	if	political	discussion	on	social	media	increases	to	one	standard	deviation	above	the	mean.	By	contrast,	a	typical	respondent	who	is	not	a	party	member	and	who	
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discusses	politics	less	than	average	is	predicted	to	not	engage	in	any	party-related	endeavor	at	all	(with	the	index	equaling	.19),	but	when	political	discussion	on	social	media	is	raised	to	one	standard	deviation	above	average,	the	respondent	is	predicted	to	engage	in	close	to	one	party-related	activity	(.84).	The	numerical	differences	are	substantial—the	value	of	the	index	grows	by	332%	among	non-members	as	opposed	to	67%	among	members—but	the	substantive	implications	are	equally	compelling.	Higher	levels	of	political	discussion	on	social	media	make	already	active	party	members	even	more	active,	as	they	move	from	one	to	two	predicted	activities,	but	non-members	move	from	political	inaction	(with	effectively	zero	predicted	activities)	to	at	least	some	level	of	engagement	(approximating	one	predicted	activity).	In	sum,	political	discussion	on	social	media	is	associated	with	increased	participation	among	both	already	active	members	and	otherwise	inactive	non-members.	Further	evidence	of	these	dynamics	can	be	seen	in	the	country	coefficients	in	model	2	(see	again	Table	1).	The	positive	and	significant	coefficients	for	Italian	and	UK	respondents	indicate	that	party	non-members	in	Italy	and	the	UK	engage	in	a	significantly	higher	number	of	party-related	activities	than	party	non-members	in	Germany.	In	other	words,	where	parties	are	weaker	and	less	legitimate,	those	who	want	to	get	involved	with	politics	are	more	likely	to	do	so	as	citizen	campaigners	than	as	party	campaigners.	Recalling	that	German	respondents	were	overall	substantially	less	engaged	than	British	and	Italian	ones	(as	shown	by	both	the	average	values	of	the	index	and	the	positive	and	significant	coefficients	for	the	Italy	and	UK	dummy	variables	in	the	multivariate	models),	the	greater	ability	of	German	parties	to	engage	their	members	seems	to	be	an	aggregate	double-edged	sword.	The	better	organized	parties	are,	and	the	better	they	structure	their	members’	activities	on	social	media,	the	less	they	attract	participants	from	outside	their	ranks.	Before	discussing	the	main	implications	of	our	findings,	we	acknowledge	that	they	are	subject	to	some	degree	of	endogeneity	due	to	the	cross-sectional	nature	of	our	data,	which	do	
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not	warrant	strong	causal	claims,	even	though	our	hypotheses	focused	on	correlations	rather	than	causal	effects.	Secondly,	our	surveys	were	administered	in	the	aftermath	of	European	elections,	which	have	specific	characteristics	that	are	not	necessarily	present	in	general	elections.	Thirdly,	we	compared	two	countries	with	similarly	high	levels	of	internet	access—Germany	and	the	UK—with	another—Italy—with	lower	levels	of	access,	which	suggests	caution	when	generalizing	these	findings	beyond	the	populations	of	interest.	Because	citizens	with	internet	access	tend	to	have	higher	socio-economic	status	than	those	without	internet	access,	and	because	socio-economic	status	also	predicts	political	engagement,	it	is	plausible	that	our	sample	selection	strategy	may	have	led	us	to	recruit	Italian	respondents	who,	whilst	representative	of	the	Italian	online	population,	are	generally	more	engaged	in	politics	than	they	would	be	if	levels	of	internet	use	in	Italy	were	similar	to	those	in	Britain	and	Germany.	Finally,	although	we	see	great	promise	in	comparative	research	on	social	media	and	politics,	it	is	difficult	to	disentangle	causal	patterns	related	to	contextual	factors	while	studying	only	three	countries	at	a	single	point	in	time.	We	theorized	that	the	strength	and	legitimacy	of	party	organizations	shape	the	relationship	between	party	membership	and	party-related	engagement	via	both	supply-	and	demand-related	mechanisms.	However,	other	systemic	characteristics,	such	as	candidate	and	leader	selection	methods	and	campaign	finance	regulations,	may	also	play	a	role	(see	Anstead	and	Chadwick	2009).	Primaries	and	direct	leadership	elections	incentivize	outsiders	and	their	supporters	to	experiment	with	digital	tools,	thus	mobilizing	citizen	campaigners.	In	the	countries	we	studied,	however,	there	is	no	cross-party	convergence	(as	there	is	between	the	Democratic	and	Republican	parties	in	the	US)	in	the	ways	leaders	and	candidates	are	selected,	so	this	factor	may	explain	differences	between	parties	rather	than	countries.	Campaign	finance	regulation	also	differs	across	the	countries	we	studied,	with	German	parties	enjoying	generous	public	funding,	British	parties	mostly	relying	on	unlimited	private	donations,	and	Italian	parties	currently	benefiting	from	
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residual	public	funding	but	also	facing	increasing	pressure	to	tap	uncapped	private	contributions	(Vaccari	2013).	However,	none	of	these	countries	limit	individual	donations,	which	Anstead	and	Chadwick	(2009)	show	incentivize	US	campaigns	to	recruit	large	numbers	of	small	online	donors,	many	of	whom	then	become	citizen	campaigners.		
Conclusions	In	this	study	we	have	questioned	two	common	narratives	about	political	parties	and	their	relationship	with	the	internet—that	parties	are	facing	an	unstoppable	decline	and	that	digital	media	contribute	to	this	decline	because	they	distract	citizens	or	they	only	engage	activists	who	are	already	engaged.	By	contrast,	we	have	shown	that	digital	media	should	be	considered	part	of	the	solution	rather	than	the	problem	of	party	crisis.	The	fact	that	party	activists	are	more	likely	to	engage	with	parties’	social	media	presence	is	just	one	half	of	the	story—the	other	is	that	activists	use	these	platforms	to,	among	other	things,	distribute	party	messages	beyond	supporters.	Non-members	who	engage	in	informal	political	discussions	online	also	perform	online	activities	that	are	valuable	for	parties.	The	low-threshold	nature	of	the	endeavors	we	conceptualized	as	comprising	party-related	engagement	makes	them	appealing	across	a	broader	constituency	than	the	narrower	constituency	of	party	members.	Even	if,	on	average,	an	individual	“party	campaigner”	provides	more	activities	and	resources	than	a	“citizen	campaigner,”	in	most	populations	there	are	likely	to	be	many	more	of	the	latter	than	the	former,	and	so	the	aggregate	contributions	of	citizen	campaigners	may	conceivably	approximate,	or	even	exceed,	the	aggregate	contributions	of	party	campaigners.	Social	media	can	thus	help	parties	mobilize	support	and	gather	feedback	from	both	their	core	membership	base	and	a	wider	subset	of	engaged	citizens	who	are	not	committed	to	parties	but	enjoy	discussing	politics	on	social	media.	Not	only	do	social	media	contribute	to	hybridizing	repertoires	of	party	activism,	but	they	are	also	promoting	a	hybridization	of	party	activists,	
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bringing	together	older	and	newer	types	of	participants	who	may	have	different	views	of	party	engagement	and	different	reasons	for	taking	part	in	it.	These	developments	suggest	avenues	for	future	research	investigating,	for	instance,	the	strategies	parties	employ	to	channel	citizen	campaigners	towards	shared	goals,	the	extent	to	which	citizen	campaigners	engage	in	grassroots	party	politics,	and	whether	internal	power	relationships	are	bound	to	be	restructured	as	a	result	of	their	influx.	If	parties	persist	in	their	attempt	to	cajole	sympathizers	to	become	more	involved	in	their	activities	and	decision-making	(Scarrow	2015),	their	targeting	of	citizen	campaigners	may	result	in	new	and	more	inclusive	participatory	mechanisms,	with	important	implications	for	party	internal	dynamics.	For	instance,	the	French	Socialist	Party	in	2007	introduced	online	membership	at	a	€20	discounted	price	to	promote	participation	in	the	primaries	to	select	its	Presidential	candidate.	In	2014	the	UK	Labour	party	created	the	category	of	“registered	supporters”,	who	acquired	the	right	to	vote	for	the	party	leader	by	paying	a	one-off	minimum	fee	of	£3	on	the	party	website.	Outsider	parties	such	as	the	Spanish	Podemos	and	the	Italian	Five	Star	Movement	have	adopted	even	more	radical	strategies,	allowing	members	to	enrol	online	for	free.	Parties	are	trying	to	harness	digital	media	in	a	hybrid	mix	with	their	efforts	on	the	ground	to	enlist	citizen	campaigners	who	can	either	rejuvenate	their	core	activist	bases	or	create	new	constituencies	of	support.		This	qualitative	and	quantitative	expansion	of	party	membership	could	lead	to	potential	tensions	in	the	balance	of	power	within	organizations,	as	party	elites	may	be	more	at	ease	with	their	ordinary	rank-and-file	members	than	with	citizen	campaigners	whose	behaviours	are	likely	to	be	more	difficult	to	predict	and	control.	To	avoid	these	risks,	parties	can	be	expected	to	continue	pursuing	a	strategy	of	“controlled	interactivity”	(Stromer-Galley	2014)	that	allows	them	to	maintain	power	over	key	decisions	while	delegating	and	diffusing	some	aspects	of	their	execution.	However,	when	it	comes	to	high-profile	internal	decisions,	
 19 
the	party	establishment	may	find	it	difficult	to	contain	the	forces	set	in	motion	by	the	combination	of	digital	affordances	for	supporter	engagement	and	the	opening	up	of	political	opportunities.		The	complex	interplay	between	older	and	newer	modes	of	party-related	engagement,	and	its	implications	for	internal	party	politics,	were	in	full	display	in	the	2015	UK	Labour	party	leadership	election,	where	as	many	as	105,600	(out	of	a	total	112,000	online-enrolled)	registered	supporters	voted,	little	less	than	half	the	245,675	(out	of	a	total	292,000)	full	members.	Jeremy	Corbyn,	a	textbook	party	outsider	who	had	been	a	backbencher	for	all	his	32	years	in	Parliament,	was	elected	leader	with	the	support	of	an	overwhelming	83.8%	of	registered	supporters,	as	opposed	to	49.6%	among	full	members.13	The	success	of	the	Corbyn	campaign	was	based	on	a	hybrid	mix	of	traditional	volunteering,	mostly	engineered	by	trade	unions,	and	digitally	enabled	strategies	to	recruit	registered	supporters	and	distribute	the	campaign	message	on	social	media.	To	some	degree,	the	findings	shown	here	suggest	that	already	in	2014	there	was	a	reservoir	of	citizen	campaigners	who	were	not	party	members	but	were	ready	to	participate	in	party-related	activities,	which	the	Corbyn	campaign	tapped	into.		 The	disruptive	potential	of	citizen-campaigners	on	internal	party	politics	may	be	contingent	on	the	political	opportunities	provided	by	institutional	arrangements.	These	opportunities	were	present	in	the	UK	Labour	party’s	2015	leadership	election,	and	may	also	exist	in	some	Italian	parties—such	as	the	Democratic	Party	and	the	Five	Star	Movement,	which	to	some	degree	recruit	supporters	online	and	allow	them	some	influence	over	internal	decisions.	However,	other	parties	in	the	same	countries,	as	well	as	all	of	the	main	German	parties,	do	not	provide	substantial	opportunities	for	non-members	to	influence	internal	decisions,	which	may	limit	the	influence	of	online-mobilized	outsider	activists.	
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Although	Western	parties	are	facing	monumental	challenges,	social	media	are	not	hastening	their	decline—quite	to	the	contrary,	they	both	help	new	digital	foot	soldiers	to	emerge	and	allow	existing	members	to	expand	their	repertoires.	That	said,	our	data	measure	(self-reported)	involvement	with	party-related	activities,	but	do	not	address	whether	such	activities	were	conducted	in	accordance	with	party	goals	and	consistently	with	core	party	messages.	It	is	an	open	question	whether	both	party	campaigners	and	citizen	campaigners	are	reliable	“agents”	to	their	party	“principals,”	as	highlighted	by	Enos	and	Hersh	(2015).	Relatedly,	our	findings	speak	to	a	growing	body	of	research	(Nielsen	2012)	showing	that	party	campaigning	on	the	ground	no	longer	depends	solely	on	grassroots	organizing	and	coordination	in	physical	settings,	but	also	on	the	integration	of	online	and	offline	tools	and	endeavors.	Since	the	background,	motivations,	and	skills	of	party	campaigners	are	likely	to	be	different	from	those	of	citizen	campaigners,	coordinating	them	across	both	digital	and	physical	environments	could	be	increasingly	challenging,	even	if	facilitated	by	data-driven	computational	management	(Kreiss	2012).		 Finally,	although	the	processes	discussed	in	this	research	are	developing	in	all	the	three	countries	we	studied,	and	on	theoretical	grounds	can	be	expected	to	be	reproduced	across	most	Western	democracies,	the	quality	and	quantity	of	such	developments	vary	in	accordance	with	the	systemic	features	of	each	country.	In	particular,	the	strength	of	party	organizations	has	emerged	as	a	potentially	important	condition	for	the	broadening	of	online	activities	among	both	members	and	supporters.	Digital	media	may	rejuvenate	the	relationship	between	parties	and	their	members	in	the	contexts	where	this	is	less	needed	(such	as	Germany),	while	appealing	more	to	non-members	in	contexts	where	parties	have	suffered	steeper	organizational	declines	(such	as	Italy	and	the	UK).	The	extent	to	which	social	media	deepen	engagement	among	members	and	broaden	it	among	non-members	is	path-dependent	
 21 
on	the	organizational	legacies	of	the	parties	themselves,	while	at	the	same	time	being	an	important	part	of	the	story	of	how	they	can	be	revitalized.		
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Table	1	–	Estimated	coefficients	for	party-related	engagement	(0-6	index)	
		 Model	0		 Model	1	 Model	2		 Coefficient	 S.E.	 Coefficient	 S.E.	 Coefficient	 S.E.		Party	member	 .880***	 .055	 1.206***	 .105	 1.752***	 .104	Political	discussion	on	social	media		 2.121***	 .102	 2.100***	 .102	 2.740***	 .110		
Country*Party	member	(Germany=reference)	Italy*Party	member	 /	 /	 -.444***	 .118	 -.380***	 .111	UK*Party	member	 /	 /	 -.382**	 .125	 -.329**	 .116		Political	discussion*Party	member	 /	 /	 /	 /	 -1.782***	 .165		
Country	(Germany=reference)	Italy	 .410***	 .062	 .586***	 .083	 .542***	 .084	United	Kingdom	 .283***	 .063	 .439***	 .089	 .442**	 .089		
Sources	of	political	information	Internet	 .751***	 .132	 .744***	 .133	 .709***	 .131	Newspapers	 .426***	 .096	 .415***	 .096	 .382**	 .094	Television	 -.079	 .119	 -.073	 .119	 -.084	 .118	Radio	 .180	 .094	 .194	 .095	 .227*	 .093		Political	efficacy	 .792	 .121	 .788***	 .120	 .637***	 .114	Interest	in	politics	 .369***	 .103	 .377***	 .102	 .353***	 .095	Trust	in	parties	 -.114	 .073	 -.088	 .074	 .024	 .071		Gender	(male)	 .090*	 .045	 .094*	 .045	 .073	 .042	Age	 -.114	 .104	 -.116	 .102	 -.123	 .099	Education	 .016	 .066	 .018	 .066	 -.009	 .062	Income	 -.045	 .083	 -.048	 .081	 -.024	 .076		Constant	 -2.984***	 .124	 -3.125***	 .133	 -2.598***	 .136		
N	 3869	 	 	 3869	 3869	 	Pseudo-R2	 .391	 	 	 .393	 .406	 	Likelihood	ratio	χ2	 3892.983	 	 	 3911.868	 4051.167	 	Note:	All	non-dichotomous	independent	variables	have	been	normalized	in	a	range	between	0	and	1.	The	variable	expressing	political	discussion	on	social	media	is	centered	around	its	mean	in	Model	2.	Dummy	variables	identifying	missing	observations	for	income	and	political	efficacy	have	been	omitted	from	the	table;	see	notes	10	and	11	for	details.	***p≤.001	**p≤.01	*p≤.05	
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                                                1	Retrieved	from	http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm	(accessed	30	June	2014).	
2	In	2015,	membership	of	the	Labour	party	surged	as	a	result	of	two	phenomena.	First,	the	party	recruited	more	than	100,000	registered	supporters	(a	development	we	discuss	in	the	concluding	section).	Secondly,	following	the	election	of	Jeremy	Corbyn	as	leader,	Labour	nearly	doubled	its	membership	from	201,293	before	the	2015	general	election	to	388,407	on	10	January	2016	(see	http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jan/13/revealed-how-jeremy-corbyn-has-reshaped-the-labour-party,	accessed	15	January	2016).	The	Corbyn-led	surge	in	Labour	membership	can	actually	be	explained	by	our	findings,	as	discussed	in	the	conclusions.	
3	See	http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/10/03/news/pd_crollo_iscrizioni-97212221/	(accessed	7	October	2014).	
4	See	http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/systeme/empsoz/schriften/Arbeitshefte/ahosz19.pdf	(accessed	14	October	2014).	
5	Data	retrieved	from	http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm	(accessed	22	June	2015).	
6	See	http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Internet_and_cloud_services_-_statistics_on_the_use_by_individuals	(accessed	21	December	2015).	
7	All	items	were	introduced	by	a	question	asking	respondents	whether	they	had	performed	each	of	the	activities	“in	the	past	12	months”.	Response	modes	were	“yes”,	“no”,	and	“can’t	remember”.	Our	index	is	a	count	of	all	the	“yes”	answers	to	each	item.		
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                                                                                                                                                            8	We	measure	this	variable	through	the	question:	“Over	the	past	12	months,	have	you	been	member	of	any	political	party?	Yes;	No;	Don’t	remember”.	We	coded	the	values	in	the	same	way	as	for	the	variables	included	in	the	index	of	party-related	engagement.	Party	members	were	10.1%	in	the	Italian,	6.7%	in	the	German	and	10.2%	in	British	sample.	
9	We	measure	this	variable	through	two	separate	questions,	one	for	posting	and	another	for	reading	political	messages	on	social	media:	“Thinking	about	everything	you	have	posted	recently	on	social	media,	such	as	status	updates,	comments,	replies,	retweets,	and	links,	about	how	much	of	what	you	have	posted	is	related	to	politics,	political	issues	or	the	2014	elections?”	and	“How	about	the	messages	you	have	recently	received	from	people	you	follow	or	are	in	contact	with	on	social	media?	How	many	of	them	are	related	to	politics,	political	issues	or	the	2014	elections?”	Respondents	could	answer	both	questions	by	indicating	a	number	between	0	(none)	and	10	(all).	After	normalizing	the	resulting	variable	in	a	range	between	0	and	1	the	country	values	are	as	follows.	Germany:	mean	.20,	median	.05,	SD	.25.	Italy:	mean	.31,	median	.25,	SD	.27.	UK:	mean	.28,	median	.20,	SD	.27.	
10	Because	our	income	variable	had	831	missing	values,	rather	than	introducing	bias	through	listwise	deletion	(King	et	al.	2001),	we	mean-replace	these	missing	values	and	add	a	dummy	variable	to	the	analysis	identifying	these	cases.	With	this	set-up,	the	coefficient	on	any	given	variable	with	missing	data	should	be	interpreted	as	the	effect	of	that	variable	on	our	dependent	variable	for	the	cases	for	which	we	have	observations	of	the	independent	variable	in	question;	we	thank	Josh	Tucker	for	suggesting	this	approach.		
11	This	variable	has	been	created	by	recoding	and	aggregating	answers	to	three	different	questions	all	introduced	by	the	phrase:	“How	much	do	you	agree	with	these	statements?”.	The	statements	were:	“People	like	me	have	no	influence	on	what	the	government	does”;	“Politicians	are	interested	in	what	people	like	me	think”;	“Sometimes	politics	is	so	
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                                                                                                                                                            complicated	that	you	cannot	understand	what	is	happening”.	The	aggregate	variable	had	381	missing	values	because	a	substantial	number	of	respondents	answered	“don't	know”	to	at	least	one	question.	We	performed	the	same	procedure	as	adopted	for	income	to	ensure	that	these	respondents	are	still	included	in	our	analysis	(see	previous	note).	
12	The	values	for	the	effect	size	estimates	reported	in	this	paragraph	are	calculated	on	the	basis	of	Model	2	in	Table	1	by	setting	all	variables	besides	party	membership	and	political	discussion	to	their	mean	(for	ordinal-	and	interval-level	variables)	and	mode	(for	dichotomous	variables)	across	the	pooled	sample.		
13	See	http://www.labour.org.uk/blog/entry/results-of-the-labour-leadership-and-deputy-leadership-election	(accessed	22	December	2015).	
